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ABSTRACT 
Federal decision makers considering a policy of devolving the 
responsibility for environmental protection to the states need to consider 
two kinds of limitations that states impose on their own rulemaking 
powers. “No more stringent” rules prohibit the state from imposing 
regulations that are more stringent than counterpart federal regulations; 
Private property rights acts discourage regulations that limit an owner’s use 
of private property. This Note surveys twenty-seven “no more stringent” 
rules and twenty private property rights acts. It analyzes the extent to which 
they inhibit states from filling gaps caused by the rollback of federal 
authority. Each set of state rules is then ranked on a relative stringency 
scale. A case study analysis is used to show how a rollback in federal Clean 
Water Act authority might affect the assumption of responsibility to 
provide environmental protection to wetlands. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
After thirty years of federal dominance in the sphere of environmental 
protection, there are increasing calls for transfer of responsibility for 
environmental protection to the states. Consequently, a general policy of 
devolving responsibility from the federal government to the states is 
gaining support at the national level. In fact, it is among the goals 
expressed by former Utah Governor Mike Leavitt, the recently appointed 
head of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).1 While devolution of 
federal power is not limited to the field of environmental protection, it does 
present unique problems in this area where few issues are neatly confined 
within state political boundaries. 
                                                          
 1. Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States to Provide a Procedure By 
Which the States May Propose Constitutional Amendments: Hearing on H.R.J. 84 Before the House 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (Statement of 
Governor Mike Leavitt) (“Our mission . . . should be to restore the original balance between states and 
the national government. The best way to do that is for the states to be stronger. Stronger states will 
produce a better national government.”). 
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The issue of devolution recently came to a head in the aftermath of the 
2001 Supreme Court decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook 
County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers.2 Until this decision, one 
of the most sweeping federal environmental protections for water quality 
was jurisdictionally based on the “Migratory Bird Rule,” declaring that 
Clean Water Act (CWA) jurisdiction will attach to any water that is used, 
or would be used, by birds in their seasonal migrations.3 In effect, this rule 
granted jurisdiction over every surface water in the United States. In 
SWANCC, however, the Supreme Court declared that the Migratory Bird 
Rule could no longer serve as the sole basis for asserting jurisdiction over 
certain intrastate, nonnavigable waters.4 
The Court’s opinion had important federalist overtones: There are 
waters of the United States, which implies there are waters of the states.5 
By extension, since the decision permanently excluded a category of 
“isolated” waters from federal control under the CWA, the Court 
essentially demanded that states protect these “isolated” waters if they are 
to receive any protection at all. Despite the clarity in federalist ideology, 
the opinion was less than clear about which waters would be considered 
“isolated” for jurisdictional purposes.6 
To resolve this uncertainty, EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers (USACE) published an Advance Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking to solicit public comment on the jurisdictional limits of the 
CWA.7 Over 100,000 public comments were submitted, including 
comments from national environmental organizations, major industry 
associations of the regulated community, and forty-six states.8 
Industry groups, encouraged by the possibility of replacing 
cumbersome federal rules with potentially friendlier state rules, focused on 
one of the purposes of the CWA “to recognize, preserve, and protect the 
primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and 
eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use . . . of land and water 
resources . . . .”9 They argued that a focus on state control was not only 
                                                          
 2. 531 U.S. 159 (2001) [hereinafter SWANCC]. 
 3. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2003), clarified in 53 Fed. Reg. 20,765 (June 6, 1988); 51 Fed. Reg. 
41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986). 
 4. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 159. 
 5. Id. at 174. 
 6. Id. at 171-72. 
 7. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of 
“Waters of the United States,” 68 Fed. Reg. 1,991 (Jan. 15, 2003). 
 8. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers & the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Advance Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of “Waters of the United 
States” (April 16, 2003) (eDocket ID OW-2002-0050) 
 9. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000). 
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consistent with the CWA, but furthermore was necessary to rein in federal 
environmental protections that had become so sweeping that they 
unconstitutionally impinged on traditional notions of state sovereignty 
envisioned by our federalist system.10 
In response to concerns from environmentalists that more state control 
would lead to a breakdown in environmental protection,11 the regulated 
community argued that devolution was not a rollback, but merely a shift of 
power.12 Thus, as the federal government steps out of its role, states would 
step in to fill the jurisdictional gap and maintain a constant level of 
environmental protection. 
This scheme raises an obvious question: Can states really fill the gap? 
In grappling with this issue, one is immediately confronted with legal 
limitations that states impose on themselves to discourage state-level 
environmental protection. Even where state agencies show a willingness to 
fill the jurisdictional gap, the majority of state environmental agencies are 
hampered by one of two forms of legal limitations: “no more stringent” 
rules (NMSRs) and private property rights acts (PPRAs).13 
So before one can answer whether states could indeed fill a 
jurisdictional gap, therefore, one needs to understand these legal 
limitations. How far do they reach? How do they serve to block state 
rulemaking? What are their policy justifications? 
                                                          
 10. See, e.g., The Foundation for Environmental and Economic Progress et al., Comments in 
Response to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s 
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of “Waters of 
the United States” (Apr. 16, 2003) (eDocket ID OW-2002-0050-1829) [hereinafter FEEP Comments]. 
 11. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council et al., Comments for the EPA Water Docket 
(Apr. 16, 2003) (eDocket ID OW-2002-0050-1674) [hereinafter Joint Greens Comment]. 
 12. See, e.g., FEEP Comments, supra note 10. 
 13. Even where state agencies are free to create environmental regulation in the absence of 
NMSRs and PPRAs, they are still bound by the jurisdictional limits that are set for them by the state 
legislature. In the field of water quality management, they are limited by the state’s definition of 
“waters of the state, or its equivalent,” in the same way that EPA and USACE are limited by the 
definition of “waters of the United States.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000). Although states are free to 
define “waters of the state” as broadly as they choose—they are not bound by the Commerce Clause—
they sometimes, be it through purpose, carelessness or lack of scientific knowledge at the time of 
drafting, have created situations where they have excluded certain waters from this definition. For 
example, in North Carolina, the definition of “waters of the state” does not include wetlands, only 
“swamps.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-212(6) (2003). If “swamps” were to be interpreted as “traditional 
swamps,” then many wetlands could be excluded, like ones without year-round standing water. See 
Elizabeth Hendrix, The Legal Status and Protection of North Carolina’s Isolated Wetlands 19-22 (2003) 
(unpublished Master’s Project, Duke University) (on file with the Nicholas School of the Environment, 
Duke University). It is important to recognize that these state-to-state definitions of territorial waters are 
additional limitations on the ability of states to fill jurisdictional gaps. However, they are outside the 
scope of this paper, which is focused on deliberate limitations to rulemaking. 
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The purpose of this Note is to help answer the following question: In 
light of “no more stringent” rules and private property rights acts, would 
states be able to maintain federal levels of environmental protection? 
Following up on the SWANCC comments that prompted this Note, it 
focuses specifically on the issue of water quality. 
Part II explains in more detail the policy justifications for devolution 
of federal power, and how and why some states have responded with self-
imposed limitations. Part III is a taxonomy of NMSRs, followed by a 
categorization of each state. Part IV repeats this analytical process for 
PPRAs. Part V uses the state-by-state stringency categorizations to indicate 
how effectively states with high wetland acreages will be able to fill the 
gaps from any rollback in federal jurisdiction. 
The analysis in Part V should provide an understanding of the 
interplay between state rulemaking limitations and wetland endowments, 
but it does not purport to make any conclusions about actual state by state 
responses to a federal rollback. The Note intends, rather, to give observers 
an idea of the extent to which states may be inhibited from filling gaps in 
federal protection of water quality. Thus, for example, it would be 
fallacious to conclude that a given stringency will result in a given acreage 
of unprotected wetlands. However, one could reasonably conclude that a 
state with a high stringency score and a large acreage of wetlands would 
have trouble maintaining existing levels of federal protection, if it chose to 
maintain protections at all. Furthermore, while many of the statutes 
considered are of general applicability, one should exercise care in 
extrapolating to issues other than water quality. The taxonomic keys were 
designed based on a survey of water quality related statutes alone. 
II.  STATE RESPONSES TO DEVOLUTION 
A. Debating Devolution 
The argument over devolution is, at its core, an argument over 
competing theories of efficient administration. Which of the governments 
in our federal system—state or federal—is better able to meet the needs of 
interested parties in a swift and satisfactory manner? This is a general 
question, and it spans much more than environmental issues, although 
those are all that are considered here. 
It is important to distinguish devolution from cooperative federalism. 
Under cooperative federalism, the federal government delegates certain 
programmatic powers to the states, with the understanding that the states 
shall meet minimum requirements, and that the federal government may 
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intervene to the extent that states do not live up to their obligations.14 The 
devolution considered in this paper occurs when the federal government 
withdraws its rulemaking authority. This withdrawal may occur when the 
federal government voluntarily abandons its rulemaking powers, or when 
its declines to assert its power to the extent permissible under the 
Constitution.15 In either case, states are forced to create and enforce their 
own regulations to protect environmental resources that lose federal 
protection. 
The arguments in favor of devolution have an intuitive appeal. 
Proponents argue that state and local governments are closer to affected 
parties, which makes them both more sensitive and more responsive to 
local needs.16 Furthermore, this proximity allows for regulations tailored to 
specific local circumstances. Through devolution, “one-size-fits-all” 
national regulations and their consequent inefficiencies can be replaced 
with targeted regulations that achieve the same benefits at lower cost.17 
Finally, from a constitutional standpoint, those powers not delegated to the 
federal government are reserved for the states under the Tenth 
Amendment,18 and there are no enumerated powers specifically directed to 
the environment. 
The arguments against devolution are also compelling. First, 
ecological boundaries are quite distinct from political boundaries; therefore 
national standards are the most effective way to ensure consistent treatment 
of ecosystems that span political jurisdictions. Second, if states are allowed 
to have non-uniformity in their regulations, many commentators predict 
that it will lead to a so-called “race to the bottom,” in which competitive 
economic pressures harm social welfare by forcing states to lower their 
levels of environmental protection—thereby lowering the cost of doing 
business—to attract industry to the state.19 While this outcome is not 
                                                          
 14. For example, the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permitting program under 
§ 402 of the CWA is a delegated program that would be considered an effort in cooperative federalism. 
The federal government authorizes states to issue discharge permits, but retains the ability to demand 
stricter permit limits, and to enforce against noncompliant permittees. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000). 
 15. For example, in SWANCC, the Supreme Court never concluded whether Congress could 
regulate “isolated” wetlands under its Commerce power; it merely stated that Congress did not clearly 
intend to exercise its Commerce power to its fullest extent. SWANCC v. USACE, 531 U.S. 159, 172-73 
(2001). Therefore, in the case of wetland regulation, the devolution occurs as a byproduct of the 
SWANCC decision and Congress’ failure to assert its Commerce power fully in the interim. 
 16. James L. Huffman, Thirtieth Anniversary Edition Essays: The Past and Future of 
Environmental Law, 30 ENVTL. L. 23, 31 (2000). 
 17. Id. 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 19. See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To 
the Bottom?”, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 283-84 (1997) (debating the existence of a race to the bottom). 
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certain,20 the very fact that “no more stringent” rules exist suggests that 
states believe a race to the bottom is possible (if not likely), and that they 
need to protect their statewide industry from anticompetitive environmental 
regulation. In this sense, states are not worried about racing to the bottom; 
rather, they do not want to get stuck at the top. Finally, even though many 
business entities favor devolution because it allows them to exert pressure 
on a smaller political body, others are less sanguine, because it means a 
patchwork of state laws to follow as opposed to a single national 
regulation.21 Likewise, for smaller regional firms competing with national 
competitors, uniform environmental rules ensure a level playing field.22 
There is no consistent state response to the possibility of devolution. 
In some cases, states welcome the increased authority. In its comments on 
the SWANCC decision, Alaska eagerly requested the opportunity to set its 
own wetland policy.23 Many other states, in particular those with many 
bordering states, oppose devolution of federal control out of a fear of cross-
border externalities resulting from states with weaker regulations.24 
If a state has an interest in protecting its resources, there is no question 
that it may exercise its power to extend protection to environmental 
resources within its territorial borders. By way of its police power, which 
gives a state the right to protect the public health, welfare, and safety, the 
state could allow its environmental agencies to promulgate regulations that 
meet or even exceed prior federal rules.25 
                                                          
 20. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-
Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1210-1212 (1992) 
(challenging the race to the bottom theory in the environmental context). 
 21. A Conversation on Federalism and the States: The Balancing Act of Devolution, 64 ALB. L. 
REV. 1091, 1095-96 (2001) (David L. Markell, moderator) (discussing the relative advantages of non 
uniform rules). 
 22. See id. at 1096 (opining on the effect a set of uniform laws would have on variably sized 
businesses). 
 23. See Letter from Frank Murkowski, Governor of Alaska, to the E.P.A. (Apr. 16, 2003) (on file 
with E.P.A.) (eDocket ID OW-2002-0050-1274) (commenting on the Advance Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of “Waters of the United States,” and stating 
that, “[w]e . . . believe states should be afforded much deference in land use and natural resource 
management. . . . Alaska has demonstrated that it is willing and able to protect its natural resources and 
the environmental quality of our state.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Letter from Jeffrey Wennberg, Comm’r, Department of Environmental 
Conservation, Agency of Natural Resources, Vt. (2003) (eDocket ID OW-2002-0050-1330) 
(commenting on the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory 
Definition of “Waters in the United States,” and stating that, “Vermont is dependent on the protection 
of resources in other states in order to maintain Vermont’s exceptional natural resources. Also, Vermont 
is in a keen race with other states for economic development and should not be disadvantaged in that 
competition by ad hoc decisions that relax regulatory requirements in other regions of the country.”). 
 25. See Revesz, supra note 20, at 1228 (noting that some states have promulgated standards more 
stringent than federal standards in a variety of other environmental areas). 
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But just because states have the right to extend such protections does 
not mean that their agencies are permitted freely to do so. It is here that the 
legal limitations to be discussed in this Note come into play. There are 
various policy justifications for these limitations, mentioned below, but 
they all share a common feature: The legal limitations are created by the 
state legislature to restrict the state’s inherent right to make environmental 
rules. 
Finally, a brief word is warranted for the significant budget deficits 
currently facing states. For the 2004 fiscal year, every state except North 
Dakota, Wyoming, and New Mexico has shortfalls.26 Even in the absence 
of legal limitations, these deficits suggest that states will be hesitant to fund 
the expansion of environmental programs that were formerly paid for by 
the federal government. Although budgetary concerns are a strong 
immediate argument against devolution, budgets may fluctuate and the 
argument may lose force in the future. The legal limitations, however, will 
still be obstacles to environmental rulemaking even if state governments 
are flush with funds to spend on environmental protection. 
B. “No More Stringent” Rules 
“No more stringent” rules, in their general form, require that state 
agencies not impose environmental regulations that are more stringent than 
those that are, or could be, imposed by the federal government.27 These 
rules come in many varieties,28 with significantly different levels of 
stringency, but by definition, all “no more stringent” rules affect limits that 
may be imposed, technology requirements, and other quantifiable 
standards. As long as federal environmental laws remain in place, and 
retain jurisdiction over large portions of the country, the consequences of 
these NMSRs are minimal. 
NMSRs are not constitutional and can therefore be overridden by the 
legislative process. For example, Wisconsin passed a preemptive SWANCC 
gap-filling measure in 2001, overriding their NMSR in the wetland 
context.29 Of course, whether other states will follow suit is an impossible 
question to answer, although it is worth noting that an effort is underway to 
                                                          
 26. Andrew Murr & Jennifer Ordonez, Tarnished Gold, NEWSWEEK, July 28, 2003, at 33, 35 
(inset) (highlighting deficits that include CA at $38 billion; NY $9.3 billion; TX $3.7 billion; and NC 
$2 billion). 
 27. E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-40-4.1 (1993) (“No rule . . . may be more stringent than 
any corresponding federal law, rule, or regulation governing an essentially similar subject or issue.”). 
 28. See rules cited infra note 42. 
 29. See 2001 Wis. Laws 6 (extending protection to “nonfederal” wetlands). 
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encourage just such a trend.30 In any case, it is important to remember that 
the upper extreme of most NMSRs are not part of state constitutions and 
can therefore be overridden by the ordinary legislative process. 
The policy justifications for NMSRs are clearly based on concerns 
with states’ inability to compete economically that may arise as a 
consequence of devolution.31 State legislatures do not want their 
environmental rulemaking agencies to promulgate (or in some cases 
maintain) regulations that are any stronger than necessary for fear that 
those regulations will raise the cost of doing business in the state, leading 
to a flight of industry and jobs.32 Whether such a flight would in fact 
happen is debatable, especially considering that some economically 
competitive states like California have passed rules more stringent than 
those required by the federal government,33 but the fear is quite real.34 
NMSRs interfere with gap-filling directly by imposing a cap on the 
standards that a state agency may require; they turn federal floors into 
regulatory ceilings. For statutes that impose a jurisdictional cap, the state 
agency would not be able to require permits or engage in enforcement 
actions against facilities that do not remain under federal jurisdiction. In 
these cases, gap-filling is per se prohibited. For the more benign statutes 
that allow exemptions for certain regulations, the gap-filling is not 
necessarily prohibited per se, but merely delayed and discouraged by the 
various hoops that the state agency must jump through in order to 
promulgate a rule. In these cases, the NMSRs have a deterrent effect on 
state regulators, in effect forcing them to think twice before proposing a 
rule not demanded by federal law. 
C. Private Property Rights Acts 
Private property rights acts are indirect limitations to gap-filling, but 
just as much of an obstacle to environmental protection. In their basic form, 
PPRAs require that state rulemaking agencies evaluate whether a rule or 
                                                          
 30. See Model State Wetland Statute to Close the Gap Created by SWANCC (Feb. 22, 2001) 
(furthering the effort of the Association of State Wetland Managers, which has created model 
legislation to fill the SWANCC gap), available at http://www.aswm.org/swp/model-leg.pdf. 
 31. See Jerome M. Organ, Limitations on State Agency Authority to Adopt Environmental 
Standards More Stringent than Federal Standards: Policy Considerations and Interpretive Problems, 
54 MD. L. REV. 1373, 1388-90 (1995) (stating that, “[g]iven that state legislatures may believe that their 
state is competing with other states for industrial and commercial development, state legislatures also 
understandably may seek a competitive advantage by minimizing the state agencies’ ability to impose 
environmental regulations”). 
 32. See, e.g. Revesz, supra note 20, at 1228 (noting that Connecticut had supported more stringent 
environmental regulations until realizing the damaging economic impact they might have). 
 33. See id at 1228-29 (discussing California’s pollution control requirements for automobiles). 
 34. See generally Engel, supra note 19. 
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exaction will cause a taking, and they implement safeguards to ensure that 
agency actions do not cause a taking. To determine what constitutes a 
taking, the PPRAs typically impose Supreme Court Fifth Amendment case 
law at the state level, either through codification or incorporation by 
reference.35 Furthermore, a number of these PPRAs expand the definition 
of private property, creating the real possibility that an action that could be 
undertaken by the federal government without causing a taking would, in 
fact, result in a taking if that same action were performed by a branch of 
the state government. 
The justification for PPRAs is not directly linked to devolution. In 
fact, they are a response to a perceived inadequacy of the courts to protect 
the rights of private property owners.36 This reaction is not entirely 
surprising in an era where Justice Blackmun could argue seriously in his 
personal dissent to Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council that the owner 
was not entitled to compensation as a result of a restrictive zoning rule 
because his prime beachfront property could still be used as a place to 
“picnic, camp in a tent, or live . . . in a movable trailer.”37 Even under the 
majority opinion in Lucas, the threshold for triggering a taking is the 
deprivation of all economically beneficial use.38 Only rarely will such a 
high threshold be crossed. Responding to this perceived judicial 
indifference to property owners, PPRAs place the initial burden of 
evaluating the takings impact on private property at the agency level, well 
before a controversy ever reaches the courts. 
There are two ways in which PPRAs interfere with gap-filling, 
depending on the type of statute. Those statutes that expand private 
property rights, sometimes called “compensation” statutes,39 interfere by 
lowering the threshold for what state action constitutes a taking. It is these 
statutes that are the most serious obstacles, because they block state action 
that might otherwise be legitimate if performed by the federal government. 
                                                          
 35. This may seem superfluous, since the Fourteenth Amendment would apply this law to state 
action regardless. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. Indeed, many of the Supreme Court decisions stemmed 
from controversies between property owners and state agencies. E.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 
505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). Keep in mind, however, 
that those statutes that codify the law (as opposed to those that incorporate it by reference), will retain 
force even if federal takings law changes. 
 36. See Steven J. Eagle, The Development of Property Rights in America and the Property Rights 
Movement, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 94-112 (2002) (arguing that property rights are inadequately 
protected in the U.S. courts). 
 37. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1044 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 38. Id. at 1015-16. 
 39. Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise of State Takings Legislation, 24 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 187, 191 (1997). 
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Those statutes that do not expand private property rights but merely 
call for an evaluation prior to action, sometimes called “assessment” 
statutes,40 are more indirect in their effect. By shifting the burden of 
evaluating the taking on to the state agency, not only is the agency saddled 
with additional administrative costs for each rule it must promulgate, but it 
also must face the public spotlight and political pressure. This pressure 
would tend to discourage far-reaching regulations by political actors 
concerned with appeasing key constituents in the regulated community. 
Consequently, the agency would likely scale back the scope of some 
environmental rules so as not to seem overly aggressive during the 
assessment phase. 
III.  TAXONOMY OF “NO MORE STRINGENT” RULES 
Mechanically, NMSRs leave a significant portion of the responsibility 
for environmental decisionmaking to the federal government, because the 
state is in effect deferring to federal standards. Thus, as long as the federal 
government continues to exert broad power over environmental matters, 
the practical effect of NMSRs is slight, because the federal rules will 
themselves govern the field. But should federal jurisdiction lapse, as some 
suggest could happen with isolated wetlands because of the SWANCC 
decision,41 “no more stringent” rules could be seriously tested. Would a 
federal rollback of jurisdiction require a state rollback? Or is a NMSR only 
about deferring to federal standard-setting, and distinct from jurisdictional 
issues? Is there any way to work around these self-imposed limitations on 
rulemaking in cases of state-specific need? To answer these questions, it is 
important to look at the NMSRs themselves and identify features that 
contribute to their severity. 
                                                          
 40. Id. at 190. 
 41. See FEEP Comments, supra note 10. 
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The set of twenty-seven NMSRs surveyed here42 represent those 
NMSRs in the United States that apply to rulemaking related to water 
quality. Seventeen states have NMSRs of general applicability, meaning 
that they apply to all water quality rules (and in some cases all 
environmental rules).43 Another ten have rules that apply only to a specific 
category of regulation (for example, underground storage tanks).44 Of the 
twenty-seven NMSRs, twenty-four are statutes, two are executive orders,45 
and one is a binding policy statement.46 The fact that two NMSRs are 
executive orders does not change their practical effect. Although they are 
certainly easier to override (only the will of the governor is required), for 
most purposes they are the same in language and intent as the statutory 
NMSRs, just promulgated by a different branch of government.  
This taxonomy identifies a basic set of distinct features in NMSRs 
whose presence makes a NMSR more severe. The most difficult aspect of 
creating this taxonomy was achieving the proper level of generality. While 
a few of the NMSRs seem like clones of one another, others are specific 
enough in their language that they could merit feature categories entirely to 
themselves. But such a fine level of detail would undermine the more 
general intentions of this Note, and it would subject the analysis to a 
potentially obfuscating degree of hair-splitting. In order to achieve the 
analytic goals of this Note, the taxonomy uses only groups with more than 
one member (although some only have two). While this grouping scheme 
                                                          
 42. The list originated with a footnote in Jerome Organ’s foundation article, Organ, supra note 31, 
at 1376 n.13. It is updated here in response to additions, deletion, modifications and code renumberings 
in the almost ten years since Professor Organ’s article. ALA. CODE §§ 22-35-10 (USTs), 22-36-7 
(wellheads) (2002); ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.365 (2004) (USTs); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 49-255.01 
(AZPDES), 49-1009 (USTs) (West 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-803 (2003) (USTs); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 25-8-202(8)(a) (2003); FLA. STAT. chs. 403.061(7), (31), 403.804(2) (West 2004); IDAHO 
CODE § 39-3601 (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE § 455B.173 (2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13A.120 
(administrative regulations generally), 224.16-050 (NDPES) (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, 
§ 341-D(1-B) (West 2002); Exec. Order No. 01.01.1996.03, 23-4 Md. Reg. 193 (1996); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 49-17-34 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-5-203, 75-5-309 & 80-15-110 (2002); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 81-1505(22) (2003) (SDWA); NEV. REV. STAT. 459.824 (2004) (USTs); N.D. CENT. CODE § 
23-01-04.1(1) (2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.39 (2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 27A, § 1-1-206 (2004); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 468B.110(2) (2003) (forest operations); Penn. Exec. Order No. 1996-1 (1996); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 1-40-4.1 (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-226(l) (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-5-
105 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15:1 (Michie 2000) (WWTPs); W. VA. CODE § 22-1-3 (2003); 
Wis. Board Pol. NR 1.52(3) (1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1416 (Michie 2003) (USTs). 
 43. Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
 44. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon, Tennessee, Virginia, and 
Wyoming. 
 45. Maryland, Exec. Order No. 01.01.1996.03 (1996), and Pennsylvania, Penn. Exec. Order No. 
1996-1 (1996). 
 46. Wisconsin, Wis. Board Pol. NR 1.52(3) (1996). 
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obviously results in a loss of precision, all the major features in all the 
NMSRs are accounted for, and on the whole the result—in the form of the 
state-by-state ranked order—is consistent with what one would expect from 
reading the NMSRs as a group. 
In some instances, the feature names themselves seem awkwardly 
phrased, but this contortion was necessary from an analytical standpoint to 
arrange all the names such that the presence of the feature indicates an 
increased stringency level.47 As a result, the features listed are distinct from 
those that have been identified in the literature to date. Previous literature 
has been more concerned with identifying features that create interpretive 
problems, rather than features that create gap-filling problems.48 In no way 
does this Note intend to downplay the importance of the earlier works—
indeed it would have been impossible without them—the Note merely 
distinguishes the earlier linguistic taxonomies from its own functional 
taxonomy. 
A concomitant benefit to the use of a functional taxonomy is that the 
Note can focus on readily identifiable features that may be read off the face 
of a statute, without becoming dependent on shifting case law or having to 
guess how courts will resolve the interpretive issues. The implicit 
assumption, of course, is that a given term will, at some point in the future, 
receive the same or similar interpretation across statutes. 
A. Distinct Features of “No More Stringent” Rules 
1. Affects Quantifiable Limits 
This feature is basically the litmus test for inclusion in the NMSR 
group.49 If a NMSR does not affect some kind of quantifiable limit, 
procedural requirement, or technology standard, then it is not considered in 
this Note. There is no attempt to distinguish between the stringency of 
different kinds of limits, or even to answer, for example, what is a federal 
standard.50 These interpretive issues are open questions that will be decided 
                                                          
 47. But see infra Part III.B (discussing the exception to this rule for the Limited Applicability 
feature that is a multiplier which reduces the overall score). 
 48. See, e.g., Organ, supra note 31. 
 49. If all NMSRs are included in this category, it seems like there is no purpose to it, because it 
does not help distinguish between NMSRs. However, it must be included to account for the multiplier 
for Limited Applicability, discussed infra Part III.A.6. 
 50. The questions of what is a “federal standard” and what is “stringent” are actually quite 
important to the implementation of NMSRs, and a few courts have had occasion to consider them. E.g., 
Fla. Elec. Power Coord. Group v. Askew, 366 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that a 
state law requiring different pollution control “methods” for achieving temperature control were not 
“more stringent” because they were not “in counterpoise” to federal standards); Franklin v. Natural Res. 
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by the courts and their commentators; they do not affect the relative 
stringency of a statute once we make the assumption that there will be some 
consistent interpretation. 
2. Jurisdictional Ties to Federal Regulation 
Most “no more stringent” laws are silent on the issue most important 
following SWANCC, namely, whether the absence of jurisdiction for the 
federal government should preclude jurisdiction for the state regulatory 
agency. Jurisdictional limitations are the most severe gap-filling limitation, 
because they mean that the state agency is prohibited from protecting any 
resource that cannot be protected under a federal statute. In the case of 
SWANCC, a loss of federal jurisdiction over “isolated” wetlands would 
mean that a state with a jurisdictional tie to the CWA would also be 
precluded from regulating those waters. 
Some NMSRs clearly separate jurisdictional issues from standards. 
They focus exclusively on capping the state standards at federal levels, 
ignoring whether the federal government would have jurisdiction to enforce 
those standards in all instances. These rules are not included in this 
category. Two examples are the NMSRs of Florida and Iowa. 
The Florida law focuses on a “[standard] which has been set by 
federal agencies pursuant to federal law or regulation.”51 The word “set” is 
devoid of connotations of jurisdiction. This law suggests that what matters 
is the limit that the federal government has deemed appropriate. It defers to 
the federal environmental decisionmaking process. This law implies that 
Florida is free to regulate waters that are non-jurisdictional under the 
CWA, but any standards imposed must be “no more stringent” than the 
federal government would impose if it did have jurisdiction.52 
Iowa’s law is even more explicit. It states that a state standard may not 
be more stringent than an “effluent standard or pretreatment standard 
[promulgated] pursuant to . . . the federal Water Pollution Control Act . . . 
for such a source.”53 By using “such a source,” the law is directed at a class 
of sources—which is independent of jurisdiction—and not a particular 
source that may or may not be jurisdictional. The practical ramifications 
are the same as for Florida: Iowa is free to regulate CWA non-jurisdictional 
waters, but for certain sources the limits that can be imposed are capped. 
                                                                                                                                      
& Env. Prot. Cabinet, 799 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1990) (holding that a restricted hearing procedure was “more 
stringent” than federal law because federal law did not require prepayment of fines). 
 51. FLA. STAT. ch. 403.804(2) (West 2004) (emphasis added). 
 52. Id. 
 53. IOWA CODE § 455B.173(2) (2003) (emphasis added). 
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In the NMSRs which are included in this category, the rule language 
asserts that state jurisdiction should be limited by federal jurisdiction. 
Eleven rules are of this type.54 To determine whether a statute falls in this 
category, the key question is whether the state rule ties itself directly to a 
federal statute, which would imply that the state rule shall accomplish no 
more protection than the federal statute, thus implicating jurisdiction. The 
most common way of tying state rules to federal statutes is through 
language whereby the state rule shall be “no more stringent” than 
“corresponding federal law”55 or “federal regulations . . . that address the 
same circumstances.”56 
Mississippi is an example of this jurisdiction-tying approach. Its 
NMSR declares that state rules “shall not exceed requirements of federal 
statutes and federal regulations . . . .”57 Federal jurisdiction is automatically 
implicated by using the term “requirements of federal statutes.” If the 
federal statute cannot reach some environmental resources of the state, 
Mississippi cannot impose standards that will. 58 
Kentucky’s law achieves a jurisdictional tie in a more subtle way. It 
prohibits the imposition of standards in a permit that are more stringent 
than those “which would have been applicable under federal regulation if 
the permit were issued by the federal government.”59 Although an argument 
could be made that CWA non-jurisdictional waters can still be regulated by 
the State, the plain reading of this statute is that if federal regulation cannot 
impose the condition, neither can Kentucky.60 Federal jurisdiction is not 
mentioned, but it is implied, because otherwise the act of issuing a permit is 
irrelevant, and the quoted qualification could be reduced to a statement 
about federal standards, as in Florida or Iowa. 
The most direct of all jurisdictionally tied NMSRs is from Idaho, 
which mentions the federal statute by name: “[R]ules promulgated under 
this chapter [shall] not impose requirements beyond those of the federal 
clean water act.”61 Here, there is no doubt that if the CWA cannot reach a 
water, neither can Idaho’s state environmental agency. 
                                                          
 54. See infra Table 2. 
 55. E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 1-40-4.1 (1993) 
 56. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5-203(1) (2002). 
 57. MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-17-34(2) (2003) (emphasis added). 
 58. Id. 
 59. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.16-050(4) (2003) (emphasis added). 
 60. See id. 
 61. IDAHO CODE § 39-3601 (Michie 1997). 
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3. Federal Silence Preempts 
Many NMSRs apply in a blanket fashion, such that state agencies are 
not only prohibited from exceeding existing federal standards, but also 
prohibited from setting standards in areas62 that have not been addressed a 
priori by federal standards. In essence, these laws place the full 
responsibility for environmental regulation squarely with the federal 
government. In most cases, it is impossible to tell whether federal silence is 
meant to preempt state rulemaking. To identify those rules that are meant to 
allow federal preemption of the field, one must look closely at the intent 
behind the language. Among all the categories, this one strays furthest from 
the realm of function into the realm of interpretation. For this reason, few 
statutes are included in this category. 
The Arkansas NMSR, for example, demands that the “regulations . . . 
shall as much as possible be identical to and no more stringent than the 
federal regulations adopted by [EPA].”63 The intent is clearly to keep the 
state regulations consistent with federal regulations, which by necessity 
would prevent the state from creating new regulations in the face of federal 
silence. 
A few NMSRs apply only when the federal government has spoken. 
In other words, if the federal agency has set a standard, then a state agency 
cannot exceed that standard; if the federal government has not set a 
standard, then the state agency is free to act. Both Iowa and West Virginia 
have NMSRs of this type. They are not included in this category. 
Iowa’s law explicitly declares that federal silence does not prohibit the 
imposition of a standard: “This section may not preclude . . . the 
establishment of an effluence standard for a source or class of sources for 
which the federal environmental protection agency has not promulgated 
standards pursuant . . . to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.”64 In the 
case of West Virginia: “In the absence of a federal rule, the adoption of a 
state rule shall not be construed to be more stringent than a federal rule, 
unless the absence of a federal rule is the result of a specific federal 
exemption.”65 
Regrettably, in the majority of cases, it is impossible to determine 
whether a statute intends for federal silence to preempt state rulemaking. 
Colorado’s NMSR exemplifies this difficulty. It states that the state 
                                                          
 62. “Areas” is a broad term, which is in fact used by the Alaska statute. ALASKA STAT. 
§ 46.03.365(c) (2002). As used here, the term includes all manner of sources, parameters, outfalls and 
anything else that could be the substantive basis for a difference between two regulated activities. 
 63. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-803 (2003). 
 64. IOWA CODE § 455B.173(2) (2003). 
 65. W. VA. CODE § 22-1-3a (2003). 
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commission “may [not] adopt rules more stringent than corresponding 
enforceable federal requirements.”66 Under one interpretation, the term 
“enforceable” could be read to mean that federal silence only matters where 
a federal statute is jurisdictional. This interpretation would create the 
awkward situation where the state could potentially have two sets of rules, 
one for CWA jurisdictional waters, and one for non-jurisdictional waters. 
Under a different interpretation, “enforceable” could be read to mean that 
the requirements must already exist before there is a stringency limitation; 
in the absence of federal requirements, then, the state is free to act. This 
latter interpretation seems more plausible; regardless, the statute was not 
included in this category for lack of clarity. 
4. Retroactive 
Most NMSRs are prospective in nature, meaning that they only apply 
to rules that are promulgated after the enactment of the NMSR.  By being 
prospective in application, they function to preserve the status quo at the 
time of enactment. While these provisions may assist in the situation where 
currently regulated waters are threatened with losing their existing 
protections, they still serve as hurdles in the event that the state must enact 
new rules to fill a jurisdictional gap created by a rollback of the CWA. 
The Wisconsin policy statement is an example of a prospective 
NMSR. It applies only when an agency “seeks to adopt” new rules after the 
date of August 1, 1996.67 This policy statement clearly leaves in place rules 
adopted prior to that date, and therefore prior to any future federal rollback. 
Retroactive NMSRs are less common than prospective NMSRs, but 
potentially quite devastating to preexisting state environmental protection 
programs. A retroactive NMSR requires a review of in-place state rules, 
and a withdrawal of those rules that could not be promulgated at the present 
time because of the NMSR. Consider the hypothetical case of a state that 
implemented its own CWA § 402 program and issued a National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit for an outfall into what 
later became a CWA non-jurisdictional water because of a federal rollback. 
Assuming that the NMSR affected jurisdiction,68 this permit could 
potentially be declared invalid for lack of jurisdiction, and the state agency 
would not be able to reassert authority. Retroactive rules may therefore 
affect more than gap-filling; they may in fact re-open once-filled holes. 
                                                          
 66. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-8-202(8)(a) (2003) (emphasis added) (allowing, however, more 
stringent rules “only if it is demonstrated at a public hearing, and the commission finds, based on sound 
scientific evidence . . . [that the rules] are necessary to protect the public health, beneficial use of water, 
or the environment of the state.”). 
 67. WIS. ADMIN. CODE § 1.52(3) (2004). 
 68. See supra Part III.A.1. 
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Pennsylvania’s executive order is one of the few NMSRs clear in its 
intent to apply retroactively: “Existing regulations shall be reviewed by 
agencies for consistency [with the NMSR requirements]. Any regulations 
that are inconsistent . . . shall be considered for amendment or repeal.”69 
While this NMSR does not demand repeal in all instances, it clearly puts 
preexisting rules in the spotlight. 
When a statute is silent on whether it is prospective or retrospective, 
that silence is assumed to be prospective. There are two reasons for this 
assumption. First, the principle that “[r]etroactivity is not favored in the 
law”70 should apply equally to the states as to the federal government. 
Second, the practice of this Note is to resolve ambiguity against inclusion.71 
5. Exemptions 
About half of the NMSRs have some form of exemption process that 
allows a state agency to create a regulation more stringent than a federal 
one. An exemption process has the potential for removing the teeth from an 
NMSR. Whether this happens, however, entirely depends on how difficult 
it is for the agency to earn the exemption. The simplest exemption 
procedures require a statement of findings; more complicated ones require 
public hearings; the most severe require detailed environmental and 
economic impact studies, or some combination of findings and hearings. 
When there is no exemption process, which is assumed when one is not 
specifically created by the rule, the NMSR is considered more severe than 
an otherwise identical NMSR that allows exemptions. Accordingly, 
NMSRs that allow exemptions are considered less inhibitive of a state’s 
ability to fill gaps in the federal regulatory scheme. 
Maine has one of the simplest exemption procedures. It requires that 
the agency identify “when feasible, and using information available to it,” 
provisions of the proposed rule it “believes” would impose a regulatory 
burden more stringent than that imposed by a federal standard, and then to 
set forth a justification for the differences.72 This provision does not require 
the agency to make any findings that it has not already made, nor to 
identify anything at all if the agency determines it would be infeasible. This 
exemption process makes the NMSR not so much a limitation as a minor 
formality in the state rulemaking process. 
The Montana exemption process, by contrast, is much more 
complicated. It requires written findings that the proposed rule protects 
                                                          
 69. Pa. Exec. Order No. 1996-1(2)(a) (1996). 
 70. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). 
 71. See infra Part III.C. 
 72. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 341-D(1-B) (West 2002). 
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public health or the environment, based on peer-reviewed scientific 
evidence in the record, following a public hearing and opportunity for 
public comment.73 Furthermore, there must be economic findings on the 
cost to the regulated community, and findings that the proposed rule can 
mitigate harm to the public health or environment using current 
technology.74 This process is not only time-intensive, but potentially 
expensive and fraught with opportunity for political forces to derail the 
rulemaking. This exemption process makes the NMSR function like a 
nonexpansive PPRA—it discourages promulgation of far-reaching 
regulations for fear that this complicated exemption process will be 
triggered. 
In Tennessee, the exemption process requires the state to provide 
money to municipalities for any more stringent regulation that it imposes 
that requires increased municipal expenditures.75 This exemption 
effectively requires the state legislature to fund the rule through an 
allocation process, where it is subject to delay and politicization. 
Two NMSRs even require executive approval before a rule may go 
into effect. In Florida, “[f]inal action shall be by the Governor and Cabinet, 
who shall accept, reject, modify, or remand . . . the standard.”76 To some 
extent this additional step in the exemption process is moot since 
environmental agencies are part of the executive anyway—and thus 
presumably the Governor’s office can make its wishes known early in the 
process—but this may not always be the case, especially as administrations 
change power.77 In any case, executive approval delays implementation, 
and opens the rulemaking to an additional level of political scrutiny. 
It should be clear that the mere availability of an exemption process 
does not completely eliminate the effect of the NMSR. Even in Maine, 
where the exemption is easy to earn, the NMSR still imposes an extra step 
in the rulemaking process. In Montana, the cost of the exemption process in 
terms of time and effort is so high that it might even approach the upper 
limit of the political will of the state legislature to override their NMSR in a 
select instance. In Tennessee, in which the NMSR requires that money be 
allocated in the state budget, any new rule that imposes costs on 
municipalities requires legislative acquiescence. Thus, even though the 
                                                          
 73. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-5-203(2)-(3) (2003). 
 74. Id. 
 75. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-226(l) (1999). 
 76. FLA. STAT. ch. 403.804(2) (West 2004). 
 77. See Ergonomics Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 68,261 (Nov. 14, 2000) (creating a workplace 
ergonomics rule under the Clinton administration); Steven Greenhouse, Bush Plan to Avert Work 
Injuries Seeks Voluntary Steps by Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2002, at A1 (rejecting the workplace 
ergonomics rule created under the Clinton administration). 
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possibility of an exemption exists, it does not necessarily lower the barrier 
to environmental rulemaking. 
Finally, even where there are exemption processes, most NMSRs do 
not allow blanket exemptions for emergency conditions. This lack of 
emergency awareness is an interesting oversight in the NMSRs, 
particularly since many PPRAs go to lengths to establish such provisions.78 
But this lack of explicit emergency authorization does not necessarily mean 
that states are handicapped in an emergency. In the Florida statute, for 
instance, proposed regulations go into effect immediately, then are 
subsequently subject to a review process by which they may be terminated 
6. Limited Applicability 
Most NMSRs are generally applicable, meaning that they impact all 
state environmental rulemaking in the water quality field. Seventeen rules 
are of this type.79 Although some of these seventeen apply to all 
environmental rulemaking (including air quality, zoning, and the like), and 
others only apply to rulemaking related to water quality protection, these 
two groups are considered here as one. This Note considers a state’s rule to 
be generally applicable unless it specifically limits itself to a certain aspect 
of water quality protection. 
The other ten NMSRs limit themselves to a small class of regulation 
within the broader context of water quality protection. Six of the ten apply 
only to underground storage tank regulation;80 the rest apply exclusively to 
narrow classes of regulations, such as those for forestry operations81 or 
waste-water treatment plants.82 These laws with limited applicability do not 
prohibit regulation except in their small target area. They are not 
limitations on a scale even close to that of their generally applicable 
cousins. Therefore, as a matter of relative stringency, this Note considers 
NMSRs of limited applicability as much less stringent than those of general 
applicability, regardless of the other provisions of the rule. 
B. Assignment of Stringency Points 
After the features were identified, each feature was assigned a 
“stringency score” depending on how much it interfered with gap-filling. 
The maximum possible stringency score is 100, which is the score if all 
                                                          
 78. See infra Part IV.A.10. 
 79. See infra Table 2. 
 80. ALA. CODE § 22-35-10 (1997); ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.365 (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
§ 49-1009 (1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-803 (Michie 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. 459.824 (2000); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1416 (Michie 2003). 
 81. OR. REV. STAT. § 468B.110(2) (2003). 
 82. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15:1 (Michie 2001). 
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identified features are present and there is no exemption process. All the 
scores are additive except for Limited Applicability, which is a multiplier 
of 1/10 for the scores of those NMSRs that are not generally applicable. In 
other words, the final score for a limited applicability rule is 10% of what 
the score would be for an otherwise identical generally applicable rule. As 
a consequence of this multiplier, coupled with the Affects Quantifiable 
Limits feature that is present in all NMSRs (and which has a stringency 
value greater than ten), it is impossible for a limited applicability NMSR 
ever to be more stringent than a general applicability rule under this scoring 
scheme. This condition is intended to ensure that the limited applicability 
statutes, which are generally quite stringent but narrowly focused, do not 
overweight the index. 
Table 1 on the following page shows the breakdown of points, and 
explains how the 100 possible points were divided among the features. 
Reasonable minds could obviously differ over the assignment of stringency 
points, but every effort was made to assign the points in such a way that the 
score reflected a feature’s relative ability to interfere with state gap-filling 
as discussed in Part IV.A. Throughout the process, limited sensitivity tests 
were run on the scores to ensure that no score exerted excessive weight on 
the state rankings, unless the score was merited (such as the ones for 
Limited Applicability and No Exemptions). 
Where there is an exemption process, the stringency increases with 
each additional action that is required to earn an exemption. The actions 
have been broken down into parts that reflect each of the most common 
exemption process requirements. Where the exemption process requires 
some unique action—such as the Montana requirement for evidence from 
peer-reviewed scientific studies—the Other category is used. The At Least 
Environment category is for when a NMSR allows an exemption for either 
findings of an impact on the environment or some other relevant findings. 
In this case, the assigned score was the same as the score for environmental 
impact findings alone, because it is the lowest of the findings scores. Even 
if all findings, public hearings, and approval are required, the stringency of 
the exemption process is still slightly less than having no exemption 
process at all. 
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Table 1: No More Stringent Rules Scoring 
 
Provision Description Score Justification 
Affects 
Quantifiable 
Limits 
State limits may not be 
more stringent than federal 
limits, regardless of whether 
there is federal jurisdiction. 
12 
This is the identity 
test for inclusion in 
the NMSR list. 
Therefore, all statutes 
have this feature. The 
reason it is included 
at all is because of 
the multiplier for 
General 
Applicability, which 
is only meaningful if 
there is a base set of 
points. 
Jurisdictional 
Ties to Federal 
Regulations 
State may only assert 
jurisdiction if the federal 
government could also 
assert jurisdiction. 
30 
This is one of the 
most stringent 
conditions possible, 
because it implies 
that the state may 
never regulate any 
item that could not 
also be regulated by 
the federal 
government, thereby 
subjecting the state to 
the U.S. Commerce 
Clause and other 
limitations on 
Congressional power. 
Federal  
Silence  
Preempts 
Federal silence means that 
the state may not regulate 
areas for which no federal 
rules exist. 
8 
This condition means 
that the ambit of state 
regulations is 
determined by the 
federal government. 
Nonetheless, this is 
not as stringent as a 
restriction on 
jurisdiction because 
the state may 
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establish its own 
jurisdictional limits; 
the state is just 
prevented from 
creating new classes 
of regulation. The 
score is relatively low 
in part because of the 
uncertainty involved 
with including states 
in this category. 
Retroactive 
The restriction applies to 
state regulations then-
existing at the time when 
the federal rule was 
changed, potentially 
invalidating existing state 
rules. 
20 
Retrospective 
provisions are 
stringent because 
they may destroy 
existing state rules.  
For this reason there 
is a meaningful 
penalty associated 
with them. However, 
over the long term, 
the retrospective 
application will be 
overshadowed by the 
ongoing restrictions 
discussed above. 
No  
Exemptions 
Allowed 
No exemption procedure is 
available. 30 
If no exemptions are 
allowed, the 
stringency 
requirement is 
absolute regardless of 
environmental 
consequences. Since 
no exemptions are 
allowed, the score of 
this provision is 
greater than the sum 
of all the possible 
exemption 
requirements listed. 
***OR*** 
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Exemption if… 
      Findings as to… 
Economic  
Impact 
To overcome the restriction, 
there must be a finding that 
economic harm would be 
incurred. 
6 
Economic findings 
are hard to make, 
because they require 
costly and time-
consuming analyses, 
and because there is 
often considerable 
uncertainty about the 
data and results. 
Health Impact 
To overcome the restriction, 
there must be finding that 
human health would be 
harmed. 
6 
Health impacts are 
also difficult to make, 
because small 
impacts are difficult 
to quantify, and 
epidemiological 
experiments are time-
consuming. 
Environmental 
Impact 
To overcome the restriction, 
there must be a finding that 
the environment would  
suffer adverse impact. 
2 
Environmental 
impacts are easier to 
observe, especially 
where a natural 
resource is being 
immediately touched 
by the regulation. 
Other 
Additional, state-by-state 
showings are required to 
overcome the restriction. 
2 
Some states require 
additional findings, 
although these tend to 
be relatively 
straightforward 
determinations of 
“necessity” that 
presumably may be 
prepared more easily 
than an impact 
analysis. 
At Least  
Environmental 
There are multiple findings 
that may satisfy the 
exemption process, but at 
the very least environmental 
2 
This feature receives 
the same score as 
environmental impact 
findings alone. 
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findings are sufficient. 
Public Hearing 
A public hearing must be 
held prior to any exemption 
decision, including a 
process for public comment. 
8 
Public hearings are 
time-consuming, 
regardless of whether 
they involve 
opportunity for oral 
or written comments. 
They are also time-
consuming in that the 
hearing implies an 
additional period of 
reflection to 
determine whether 
the agency action is 
appropriate in light of 
new information. 
Approval 
Legislative executive 
approval is required before 
an exemption may be 
granted. 
5 
Legislative or 
executive approval is 
subject to political 
forces, and may lead 
to results that are 
more consistent with 
special interests than 
regulatory prudence. 
Limited  
Applicability 
The stringency requirement 
applies only to select types 
of water quality regulation. 
x0.1 
This category is 
included to give a 
break to states whose 
no more stringent 
rules only apply to a 
select field of 
regulation. If the 
statute is of limited 
applicability, the 
entire score is 
multiplied by 1/10. 
Otherwise, the score 
stands (i.e. no 
discount). 
Minimum Score = 0 (least stringent) 
Maximum Score = 100 (most stringent) 
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C. Categorization by State 
All twenty-seven rules were analyzed according to whether the 
features described above were present or absent in the NMSR. In most 
cases, this was a straightforward process. In others, a limited amount of 
interpretive freedom was utilized in determining the intent of the NMSR. 
As a rule, though, where an NMSR was not clear one way or the other (for 
example, the Colorado statute in relation to federal silence83), the NMSR 
was not included in a category. Thus, the categorizations err on the side of 
under-inclusion, and therefore may underestimate actual stringency. That 
said, where a decent argument could be made for listing, the state was 
included in a category. 
To minimize the inevitable influence from personal interpretation, a 
simple sensitivity analysis was used to calibrate the scoring in a back-and-
forth process to ensure that the rankings of the states did not change 
significantly depending on a few stringency points allocated between one 
feature or another. 
Table 2 shows the breakdown by state of the features identified, along 
with each state’s final stringency score. All scores have been rounded to the 
nearest integer. 
Based on the stringency scores, Map 1 shows a map of the United 
States shaded by stringency. The scores are grouped in bins of ten points, 
which loses some precision, but does further account for the scoring 
uncertainty. 
                                                          
 83. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
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Table 2: No More Stringent Rules by State 
 
 
A
la
ba
m
a 
A
la
sk
a 
A
riz
o
n
a 
A
rk
an
sa
s 
Co
lo
ra
do
 
Category Pts      
Affects Limits 12 • • • • • 
Jurisdictional 
Ties 30      
Federal Silence 
Preempts 8 •  • •  
Retroactive 20      
       
No Exemptions 
Allowed 30 • • •   
Exemption if… 
     Findings as to… 
Economic  
Impact 6      
Health Impact 6      
Environmental 
Impact 2      
Other 2    •  
At Least  
Environmental 2     • 
Public Hearing 8     • 
Approval 5      
       
Limited  
Applicability x0.1 • • • •  
STRINGENCY  5 4 5 2 22 
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Fl
o
rid
a 
Id
ah
o 
Io
w
a 
K
en
tu
ck
y 
M
ai
ne
 
Category Pts      
Affects Limits 12 • • • • • 
Jurisdictional 
Ties 30  • • •  
Federal Silence 
Preempts 8 • •  •  
Retroactive 20      
       
No Exemptions 
Allowed 30  • • •  
Exemption if… 
     Findings as to… 
Economic  
Impact 6 •     
Health Impact 6      
Environmental 
Impact 2 •     
Other 2     • 
At Least  
Environmental 2      
Public Hearing 8      
Approval 5 •     
       
Limited  
Applicability x0.1      
STRINGENCY  33 80 72 80 14 
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M
ar
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an
d 
M
iss
iss
ip
pi
 
M
on
ta
n
a 
N
eb
ra
sk
a 
N
ev
ad
a 
Category Pts      
Affects Limits 12 • • • • • 
Jurisdictional 
Ties 30  • •   
Federal Silence 
Preempts 8     • 
Retroactive 20      
       
No Exemptions 
Allowed 30  •  • • 
Exemption if… 
     Findings as to… 
Economic  
Impact 6      
Health Impact 6      
Environmental 
Impact 2      
Other 2   •   
At Least  
Environmental 2 •  •   
Public Hearing 8   •   
Approval 5      
       
Limited  
Applicability x0.1    • • 
STRINGENCY  14 72 54 4 5 
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N
or
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O
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ah
om
a 
O
re
go
n 
Pe
nn
sy
lv
an
ia
 
Category Pts      
Affects Limits 12 • • • • • 
Jurisdictional Ties 30  • •   
Federal Silence 
Preempts 8    •  
Retroactive 20     • 
       
No Exemptions 
Allowed 30    •  
Exemption if… 
     Findings as to… 
Economic  
Impact 6   •   
Health Impact 6 •     
Environmental 
Impact 2 •  •   
Other 2  •   • 
At Least  
Environmental 2      
Public Hearing 8 •     
Approval 5      
       
Limited  
Applicability x0.1    •  
STRINGENCY  28 44 50 5 34 
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So
ut
h 
D
ak
o
ta
 
Te
nn
es
se
e 
U
ta
h 
V
irg
in
ia
 
W
es
t V
irg
in
ia
 
Category Pts      
Affects Limits 12 • • • • • 
Jurisdictional 
Ties 30 •  •  • 
Federal Silence 
Preempts 8  •  •  
Retroactive 20  •    
       
No Exemptions 
Allowed 30 •   •  
Exemption if… 
     Findings as to… 
Economic  
Impact 6      
Health Impact 6   •   
Environmental 
Impact 2   •   
Other 2      
At Least  
Environmental 2     • 
Public Hearing 8   •   
Approval 5  •    
       
Limited  
Applicability x0.1  •  •  
STRINGENCY  72 5 58 5 44 
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W
isc
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n
sin
 
W
yo
m
in
g 
Category Pts   
Affects Limits 12 • • 
Jurisdictional Ties 30 •  
Federal Silence  
Preempts 8  • 
Retroactive 20   
    
No Exemptions  
Allowed 30  • 
Exemption if… 
     Findings as to… 
Economic Impact 6   
Health Impact 6 •  
Environmental  
Impact 2 •  
Other 2   
At Least  
Environmental 2   
Public Hearing 8   
Approval 5   
    
Limited  
Applicability x0.1  • 
STRINGENCY  50 5 
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IV.  TAXONOMY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS ACTS 
State private property rights acts protect the rights of owners to 
exercise the free enjoyment of their property without the burden of 
government regulation.84 In the field of water quality regulation, dealing 
inherently with the interaction of real property and the biosphere, almost 
any regulation is going to interfere in some way with private property 
rights. But as Justice Holmes noted in Pennsylvania Coal Company v. 
Mahon, “Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident 
to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change 
in the general law.”85 The PPRAs, therefore, must balance this necessity for 
some legitimate regulation against the possibility of the government 
interfering excessively with an owner’s use and enjoyment of their 
property. 
For this reason, only a minority of the PPRAs actually expand 
property rights and create a cause of action against the state for deprivation 
under the state constitution when that same claim would be invalid under 
                                                          
 84. Ann L. Renhard Cole, Note, State Private Property Rights Acts: The Potential for Implicating 
Federal Environmental Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV. 685, 685 (1998). 
 85. 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
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the United States Constitution.86 The rest of the PPRAs limit themselves to 
assessment procedures.87 These nonexpansive statutes require the state to 
analyze the potential for a takings claim prior to regulation. They do not 
create any new cause of action; they merely slow down and discourage the 
environmental regulatory process. 
Twenty PPRAs are surveyed here.88 Seventeen of these are of general 
applicability, meaning that they apply to all forms of environmental 
regulation.89 Only three apply to limited circumstances,90 but importantly, 
these three are all expansive PPRAs. Only two generally applicable PPRAs 
expand private property rights to create new causes of action.91 
As with the NMSRs, the most difficult part of creating the taxonomy 
for PPRAs was identifying the proper level of generality for each of the 
features, but the relative uniformity of language in PPRAs facilitated this 
process.  Two features—“Affects Legislature” and “Paid Repeals”— are so 
unusual (and potentially stringent) that they merited creation of special 
categories. Again, the names of a few categories sound contorted. This 
contortion was necessary for the same reason: the features are named in 
such a way that their inclusion in a PPRA indicates an increased level of 
stringency.92 
While continuing to highlight the distinction between compensation 
and assessment, this Note prefers the terms “expansive” and 
“nonexpansive” for three reasons. First, calling a PPRA a “compensation” 
statute may give the misleading impression that compensation is required 
for any regulatory action that impinges on private property rights. This is 
                                                          
 86. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 87. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 88. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 11-810 to -811 & 41-1311 to -1313 (West 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
29, § 605 (2002); FLA. STAT. ch. 70.001 (West 2004); IDAHO CODE §§ 67-8001 to -8004 (Michie 
1997); IND. CODE § 4-22-2-32 (Michie 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 77-701 to -707 (1994); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 3:3608-3612, 3623 (West 2001) (agriculture & forestry lands); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
5, § 8056 (West 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 24.421-425 (West 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 49-33-1 
to -17 (2003) (agriculture & forestry lands); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 536.017-.018 (2001); MONT. CODE 
ANN. §§ 75-1-102 to -201 (2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-206(e) (2002) (shellfisheries); TENN. CODE 
ANN. §§ 12-1-201 to -204 (1999); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 2007.001-.045 (Vernon 2000); UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 63-90-1 to -4 & 63-90a-1 to -4 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4007 (Michie 2000); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.370 (2002); W. VA. CODE § 22-1A-1 to -6 (2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-
5-301 to -305 (Michie 2003). 
 89. See supra note 43. 
 90. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3:3608-3612, 3623 (West 2003) (agriculture & forestry lands); MISS. 
CODE ANN. §§ 49-33-1 to -17 (2003) (agriculture & forestry lands); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-206(e) 
(West 2000) (shellfisheries). 
 91. FLA. STAT. ch. 70.001 (West 2004); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 2007.001-.045 (Vernon 
2000). 
 92. With the exception of Limited Applicability, which is a multiplier that reduces the overall 
score. See infra Part IV.B. 
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not in fact the case. Second, the assessment statues rarely use the word 
“assessment,” but more typically use “expansion” terminology in language 
like “[i]t is not the purpose of this [law] to expand or reduce the scope of 
private property protections.”93 Third, the use of the 
expansive/nonexpansive dichotomy accurately describes the set of 
PPRAs—all fall in one of the two categories. 
A. Distinct Features of Private Property Rights Acts 
1. Nonexpansive 
Nonexpansive PPRAs do not create new property rights or expand 
existing ones, they merely call for an assessment of takings implications 
prior to agency action. Thus, they do not create an increased chance that the 
state will be forced to pay large compensation awards as a result of 
environmental regulation, but they do subject the process of creating 
regulation to additional procedures that lay bare the ways in which the 
regulation will interfere with private property. This process leads to 
heightened scrutiny from the public, exposure to political pressure, and the 
possibility of politically embarrassing confrontations with private property 
rights advocates. Consequently, an agency seeking to avoid unwelcome 
scrutiny or confrontation should tend to scale back potentially far-reaching 
regulations to make the assessment process more politically palatable.94 For 
this reason, nonexpansive PPRAs are not so much an obstacle to gap-filling 
as a deterrent. 
The language in the Idaho statute is typical of many nonexpansive 
PPRAs: “The purpose of this [law] is to establish an orderly, consistent 
review process that better enables state agencies and local governments to 
evaluate whether proposed regulatory or administrative actions may result 
in a taking of private property without due process of law.”95 This language 
does not suggest any intention to curtail regulatory activity, but rather it 
purports to protect the due process rights of property owners. While 
seemingly innocuous on its face, one must remember that the property 
owner would not be denied due process in any event; this statute merely 
shifts the burden of assuring due process to the state agency, which is more 
easily subjected to political pressure than the courts. 
                                                          
 93. IDAHO CODE § 67-8001 (Michie 1997) (emphasis added). 
 94. Eagle, supra note 36, at 121 (arguing nonetheless that agencies are unlikely to “zealously 
police themselves”). 
 95. IDAHO CODE § 67-8001 (Michie 1997). 
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2. Expansive 
The expansive PPRAs establish new property rights at the state level. 
Whereas the nonexpansive PPRAs are deterrents to regulation, the 
expansive PPRAs are outright obstacles. By establishing broader property 
rights, the expansive PPRAs lower the threshold for what constitutes a 
regulatory taking.96 Although the federal government could continue to 
regulate without causing a taking under the Fifth Amendment, a state 
agency promulgating an identical regulation might cause a taking under the 
expanded state definition of property if that regulation impinges on these 
new property rights. It is for this reason that expansive PPRAs are 
particularly effective at curtailing gap-filling. That said, there are only two 
expansive PPRAs of general applicability.97 Finally, it should be noted that 
expansive statutes may also call for assessment, but since this requirement 
has much less impact than the compensation threat, the statutes are 
categorized as Expansive.98 
Perhaps the most well-known of all the PPRAs, the Harris Act in 
Florida “creates a new cause of action to provide compensation to a 
landowner when the actions of a government entity impose an ‘inordinate 
burden’ on the owner’s real property.”99 The inordinate burden standard is 
new to the field of takings. There are two ways that a regulation may 
impose an inordinate burden: (1) by causing a permanent loss of the 
[landowner’s] reasonable, investment-backed expectations, or (2) by 
leaving the landowner with a use that is unreasonable and forces the 
landowner to bear a greater burden than borne by the public at large.100 
This standard is much lower than the Fifth Amendment takings standard,101 
and therefore is said to create expanded rights and a new cause of action. 
                                                          
 96. This can occur by either lowering the property value diminution needed, e.g. TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN. §2007.001-.045 (Vernon 2000), or by lowering the standard of proof, e.g. FLA. STAT. CH. 
70.001 (West 2004). 
 97. FLA. STAT. ch. 70.001 (West 2004); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 2007.001-.045 (Vernon 
2000). 
 98. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:3609 (West 2001) (requiring that a “government entity shall 
prepare a written assessment of any proposed governmental action prior to taking any proposed action 
that will likely result in a diminution in value of private agricultural property”). 
 99. David L. Powell et al., A Measured Step to Protect Private Property Rights, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 255, 265 (1995). 
 100. Id. at 273-274; see also, Jane Cameron Hayman & Nancy Stuparich, Private Property Rights: 
Regulating the Regulators, 70 FLA. BAR J. 55, 56 (1996) (stating that temporary impacts are not 
inordinate burdens, nor are actions to abate a nuisance). 
 101. Stemming a long line of cases following from Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New 
York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (‘‘The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, 
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So too, is the character of the governmental action. 
A ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a 
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The Texas act takes a different approach that is much more precise in 
the way that it creates the expanded property rights. It declares that, by 
definition, a taking is a government action that “is the producing cause of a 
reduction of at least 25 percent in the market value of the affected private 
real property.”102 It is easy to imagine an environmental regulation that in 
some instances causes a diminution in value of twenty-five percent or 
more. For example, a general regulation protecting wetlands might result in 
the denial of a construction permit to build a commercial shopping center, 
dramatically reducing the development value of the land. Even if only a 
small percentage of properties touched by a regulation have a diminution of 
value that exceeds the twenty-five percent threshold, the burden on the 
fiscal purse could be significant. This rule effectively prevents state 
agencies from promulgating serious environmental regulations. 
3. Affects Executive Agencies 
All the PPRAs surveyed in this paper apply to executive agencies. 
This category is in effect a threshold requirement for inclusion as a PPRA, 
like the Affects Quantifiable Limits category for NMSRs.103 The reason 
that PPRAs apply to executive agencies is that they are the ones that may 
promulgate environmental rules without direct legislative oversight. 
Although always subject to legislative override, the purpose of PPRAs is to 
move the assurance of due process to an earlier point in the regulatory 
process, which is why it makes sense to target the rulemakers and not 
simply wait for legislative disapproval. 
4. Affects Local Governments and Municipalities 
Some PPRAs go a step further and include local governments and 
municipalities within their purview. This paper views application to local 
governments as a measure of increased severity, because such an 
application imposes additional assessment or compensation costs on local 
governments that are less likely than the state to have the budget to pay for 
them. Furthermore, local zoning regulations may be an effective way to 
mitigate environmental harm to especially sensitive areas, but even these 
zoning regulations become subject to the PPRA if it applies to local 
governments. Ironically, one of the arguments for devolution is that 
targeted local regulations are more efficient than “one-size-fits-all” national 
                                                                                                                                      
physical invasion by government than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the 
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.’’ (citations omitted)). 
 102. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2007.002(5)(B)(ii) (Vernon 2000). 
 103. And it is included for the same reason: to establish a baseline set of points so that in 
combination with the Limited Applicability multiplier it yields a meaningful distinction between 
generally applicable PPRAs and limited applicability PPRAs. 
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rules,104 but PPRAs that apply to local governments might in fact 
discourage this sort of targeted regulation. 
5. Affects Legislative Branch 
The Mississippi PPRA is particularly noteworthy because not even 
direct legislative action escapes its compensation requirements. Although 
the effect is somewhat mitigated by the fact that it only applies to forest 
and agricultural lands, this PPRA is so far-reaching that it discourages 
environmental regulation from “the State of Mississippi, any county, 
municipality or any political subdivision thereof.”105 While it might seem 
strange that the legislature would bind its own hands—especially since the 
same legislature could presumably vote itself exceptions—this kind of rule 
is not entirely unheard of. For example, the Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act of 1995106 forces the U.S. Congress to go through an assessment 
process prior to creating federal mandates. 
6. Applies to Exactions 
An exaction is a conditioned demand by a state agency that a real 
property owner convey certain property rights in return for a permit or 
other desired benefit.107 For example, in Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission, 108 the Coastal Commission conditioned the approval of a 
construction permit on the grant of an easement for public beachfront 
access. There is little practical difference between taking the easement 
directly (which would clearly require compensation) and demanding this 
relinquishment of property rights as part of an exaction. While exactions 
continue to be covered by U.S. Fifth Amendment takings law as applied 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, the PPRAs that apply to exactions 
force a state agency to consider the takings consequences up front, well 
before the controversy reaches a court. 
Many of the PPRAs that apply to exactions are also expansive 
statutes. This correlation makes sense, because exactions by definition 
reduce the property rights of the landowner. For example, the Texas PPRA 
applies to any government action that “requires a dedication or exaction of 
private real property.”109 
                                                          
 104. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. 
 105. MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-33-7(j) (2003). 
 106. 2 U.S.C. § 1501 (2000). 
 107. Alan Romero, Two Constitutional Theories for Invalidating Extortionate Exactions, 78 NEB. 
L. REV. 348, 348 n.1 (1999) (defining an exaction as “a condition of development permission that 
requires a public facility or improvement to be provided at the developer’s expense”). 
 108. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 109. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2007.003(a)(2) (Vernon 2000). 
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Some nonexpansive statutes also apply to exactions. Consider the 
Michigan PPRA, which among other things applies to “[a] decision on an 
application for a permit or license . . . [and] required dedications or 
exactions of private property.”110  This application to exactions makes the 
statute quite onerous, because it requires a takings review for basically any 
land use decision. It is this potential for costly and numerous as-applied 
challenges that makes application to exactions a particularly stringent 
feature of a PPRA. 
7. Applies to Final Rules 
The majority of PPRAs apply to final rules,111 which are rules that 
have passed through the negotiated rulemaking process and are ready for 
implementation and enforcement. For nonexpansive statutes, application at 
this phase means that the takings assessment is basically a final step prior 
to implementation. For compensation statutes, application at this phase 
creates the immediate possibility of takings claims, although constitutional 
questions of ripeness may remain.112 Nonetheless, the intention of applying 
to final rules is to force the takings issue as soon as possible after the 
political wrangling over the rule has subsided. 
PPRAs do not state explicitly that they apply to final rules, but the 
intent can be inferred from other language. For example, the Michigan 
PPRA applies to the “enforcement of a statute or rule,”113 which can only 
occur once a rule has been finalized. Perhaps needless to say, the PPRA 
does not apply to a “formal exercise of the power of eminent domain”114—
the state can always avoid the assessment process as long as it is willing to 
compensate the landowner up front. 
8. Applies to Proposed Rules 
PPRAs that do not apply to final rules instead apply to proposed rules, 
and sometimes they apply to both.115 To some extent, the difference 
between a proposed rule and a final rule is insignificant—the proposed rule 
is merely at an earlier stage in its development.  But when a PPRA applies 
to proposed rules, it creates an incentive for the regulated community to 
challenge rules at an initial stage, discouraging the agency from 
promulgating any rule that it cannot be certain will not cause a regulatory 
                                                          
 110. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 24.422(c) (West 2001). 
 111. See infra Table 4. 
 112. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2. 
 113. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 24.422(c)(iv) (West 2001). 
 114. Id. § 24.422(d)(i). 
 115. See infra Table 4. 
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taking.116 This focus on takings at an early stage implies that there will be 
less thinking about environmental benefits and more thinking about 
property rights consequences, likely leading to fewer environmental 
benefits. 
PPRAs that apply to proposed rules are generally quite clear in their 
intent. For instance, the Wyoming language is typical: The PPRA applies to 
“[p]roposed rules by a state agency that if adopted and enforced may limit 
the use of private property.”117 Once again—a small consolation to the state 
agency—a formal exercise of eminent domain avoids the requirements of 
the statute.118 
9. Outside Review 
One important question is who performs the takings analysis. Is it 
performed by the agency that promulgates the rule; or by another 
government agency; or by a nonexecutive party? The answer to this 
question plays a major role in determining how much political pressure can 
be brought to bear on the rulemaking process. Presumably, a review by an 
outside agent, or a different branch of the government, will tend to 
discourage far-reaching rules, because more diverse interests will have a 
veto power over the rule. 
In a few states, the review is completely internal. For example, the 
Missouri law dictates that “[n]o department or agency shall transmit a 
proposed rule or regulation which limits or affects the use of real 
property . . . until a takings analysis has occurred,”119 but gives no guidance 
as to the actual analytical procedure, leaving the promulgating agency free 
to interpret how rigorous an analysis is demanded. This completely internal 
review exposes the rulemaking process to less politicization, so it is 
considered to be less severe than outside review. 
The most common process is a mix of inside and outside review, 
where the attorney general’s office writes and maintains a “checklist” that 
can be used internally by the promulgating agency to identify rules that 
have the potential to cause regulatory takings. For example, in Idaho “[t]he 
attorney general shall establish . . . a checklist[] that better enables a state 
agency . . . to evaluate proposed regulatory or administrative actions to 
assure that such actions do not result in an unconstitutional taking of 
private property. . . . All state agencies . . . shall follow the guidelines of the 
                                                          
 116. E.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-5-302(a)(iii)(A)(I) (Michie 2003). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. § 9-5-302(a)(iii)(B)(I). 
 119. MO. REV. STAT. § 536.017 (2001). 
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attorney general.”120 For purposes of this Note, this form of review is 
considered internal, even though the checklist is created by an office 
outside the promulgating agency. 
The Maine rule, by contrast, requires the agency to “[s]ubmit the rule 
to the Attorney General for approval as to form and legality,”121 upon 
which “[t]he Attorney General may not approve a rule if it is reasonably 
expected to result in a taking of private property.”122 Since there is no clear 
line as to what may “reasonably be expected to constitute a taking,” this 
PPRA gives a veto power over the regulation to an outside reviewer, 
exposing the process to politicization, and discouraging the promulgating 
agency from stepping too close to the takings line. This is not to say that 
the attorney general’s office is inherently opposed to environmental 
rulemaking, only that rulemaking (and therefore gap-filling) becomes more 
difficult when there are more parties that must be satisfied. 
Arizona’s process is unique: The law creates an “advocate office” that 
represents “the interests of private property owners in proceedings 
involving governmental action.”123 The advocate is appointed by the 
legislative council, giving the legislative branch an extra level of influence 
over the executive branch. While this sort of legislative veto is arguably 
impermissible at the federal level,124 this is a further example of how states 
can impose rules on themselves that may create unforeseen hurdles in the 
devolutionary process. 
Finally, states vary with whether the outside review is covered by 
attorney-client privilege. While the issue of privilege could merit a 
category to itself—since privileged review potentially frees regulators to 
make far-reaching decisions even when deemed questionable by the 
reviewers—it is too hard to tell whether some reviews would be 
confidential under state ethics or other rules, regardless of the silence of the 
PPRA on this matter. For the record, the three PPRAs that clearly privilege 
the review are Idaho,125 Indiana,126 and Washington.127 
                                                          
 120. IDAHO CODE § 67-8003(1) (Michie 1997). 
 121. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 8056(1)(A) (West 2002); see also id. § 8056(6) (specifying 
further that “the review . . . may not be performed by any person involved in the formulation or drafting 
of the proposed rule”). 
 122. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 8056(6) (West 2002) (allowing a few exceptions). 
 123. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1312(A) (West 2000). 
 124. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 125. IDAHO CODE § 67-8003(2) (Michie 1997). 
 126. IND. CODE § 4-22-2-32(f) (Michie 1998). 
 127. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.370(4) (2002). 
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10. No Emergency Exceptions 
A number of states go out of their way to exclude rules promulgated 
on an emergency basis from review under the PPRA.128 For example, one 
can imagine the urgent need to deny a construction permit on a wetland that 
is serving a major flood control purpose for which no alternative control 
technology is in place. Statutes that deny exceptions for emergency 
conditions are more stringent than others because they force the route of 
condemnation in a true emergency where there is no time to wait for 
assessment or outside review. 
Of the statutes that create specific emergency exemptions, Kansas is 
typical: “If there is an immediate threat to public health, safety or welfare 
that constitutes an emergency requiring immediate action to eliminate the 
risk, the report required by this section shall be prepared when the 
emergency action is completed, in which case the report shall include a 
complete description of the facts relied upon by the agency in declaring the 
need for emergency action.”129 Where a statute is silent on the issue of 
emergency exceptions, this Note assumes there are none. 
11. Fee-Shifting 
One of the most powerful features of some PPRAs is a provision 
allowing for the reimbursement of costs and attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff 
in the event the state action has indeed caused a regulatory taking. These 
provisions generally encourage litigation and administrative challenges, 
because they create an incentive for attorneys to take cases that might 
otherwise not be remunerative on a contingency fee basis.130 State agencies, 
under threat of paying fees and costs, will be seriously discouraged from 
promulgating any rule that might push the line of what is considered a 
regulatory taking. This category includes both those PPRAs where fees 
must be paid, as well as those where fees may be paid. The reason is that 
both have the same incentive—even if different in degree—to encourage 
legal challenges, especially on otherwise small cases. 
The West Virginia statute requires payment of reasonable attorneys’ 
fees and costs if either “the court determines that the division failed to 
perform the assessment required [by the PPRA]; or [i]f the court 
determines that the division . . . failed to conclude that its action was 
reasonably likely to require compensation to be paid.”131 Here, the penalty 
                                                          
 128. See infra Table 4. 
 129. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-706(6)(b) (1994). 
 130. See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 687 (1983) (citing legislative history of the 
Clean Air Act stating that fee-shifting provisions are intended to “encourage litigation which will assure 
proper implementation and administration of the act or otherwise serve the public interest”). 
 131. W. VA. CODE § 22-1A-5 (2003). 
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for an erroneous conclusion as to the takings assessment can result in major 
additional costs to the state agency, above the costs of the inverse 
condemnation. This rule acutely discourages far-reaching environmental 
rules for fear of the serious consequences of overstepping the line. The 
Texas PPRA is even more direct: “The court or state agency shall award a 
private real property owner who prevails . . . reasonable and necessary 
attorney’s fees and court costs.”132 
The Florida statute, by contrast, leaves significantly more discretion to 
the court. Attorneys’ fees are only awarded where the property owner 
prevails and the government did not make a bona fide settlement offer. As 
a measure of symmetry the government can recover its own attorneys’ fees 
if it prevails and the property owner had earlier failed to accept a 
reasonable settlement offer.133 
12. Paid Repeals 
One unusual provision in the Mississippi statute merits a category of 
its own.134 In the event that the state repeals a rule before a decision 
becomes final (in other words, before the taking occurs), the owner may 
recover its “damages arising out of the action before the repeal, and, in the 
discretion of the court, its costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney 
and expert witness fees).”135 It is easy to imagine what damages there are 
before the taking occurs, for instance, real property taxes, planning costs, 
and interest expenses associated with development delay. 
13. Limited Applicability 
The majority of PPRAs are considered generally applicable, meaning 
that they apply to any environmental regulatory decision that impacts 
private property rights. Seventeen PPRAs are of this type.136 Because of 
their broad reach, these generally applicable statutes have much more 
potential to interfere with gap-filling than limited applicability statutes, 
which only apply in narrow circumstances. 
There are three limited applicability PPRAs: In both Louisiana137 and 
Mississippi,138 the PPRA is applicable only to regulations of forestry or 
agricultural activity; In North Carolina, the law is applicable only to 
                                                          
 132. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2007.026(a) (Vernon 2000) (emphasis added). 
 133. FLA. STAT. ch. 70.001(6)(c)(1)&(2) (West 2004); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 
2007.026(b) (Vernon 2000) (similar provision). 
 134. Although it only applies to forest and agricultural lands. 
 135. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 49-33-9(2) (2003). 
 136. See infra Table 4. 
 137. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3:3608-3612, 3623 (West 2001). 
 138. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 49-33-1 to -17 (2003). 
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property interests in shellfisheries in state waters.139  Although it is likely 
that the Mississippi and Louisiana statutes will have broader gap-filling 
implications than the North Carolina statute, none of the three is considered 
generally applicable for the purposes of this Note. While the disparate 
impact is recognized, this Note draws a clear line between those statutes 
that restrict their applicability and those that do not. All limited 
applicability PPRAs are considered significantly less stringent than 
otherwise identical generally applicable statutes. 
B. Assignment of Stringency Points 
As with the NMSRs, after the features were identified each feature 
was assigned a “stringency score” depending on how much it added to the 
statute’s severity in discouraging regulatory gap-filling. The maximum 
possible stringency score is 100, which is the score if the PPRA is 
expansive and all the other features are present. Again, all the scores are 
additive except for Limited Applicability, which is a multiplier or 1/10 for 
PPRAs that are not of general applicability. As a consequence of this 
multiplier, coupled with the either Expansive or Nonexpansive feature and 
the Affects Executive Bodies feature that is present in all PPRAs—together 
they have a stringency value greater than ten—it is impossible for a limited 
applicability PPRA ever to be more stringent than a general applicability 
rule under this scoring scheme. 
Table 3 on the following page shows the breakdown of points, and 
explains how the 100 possible points were divided among the features. The 
same caveat applies here as with the NMSRs: Reasonable minds could 
obviously differ over the assignment of stringency points, but every effort 
was made to assign the points in such a way that the score reflects a 
feature’s relative ability to interfere with state gap-filling. Throughout the 
process, limited sensitivity tests were run on the scores to ensure that no 
score exerted excessive weight on the state rankings, unless the score was 
merited (such as the ones for Limited Applicability and Expansive). 
Except for the Expansive/Nonexpansive distinction, none of the other 
categories are mutually exclusive. That said, it was rare that a PPRA would 
apply to both final rules and proposed rules, although in two instances this 
was the case. Consequently, these categories remain additive, even though 
the marginal stringency of one on top of the other is perhaps less than 
either of the two measured independently. 
 
Table 3: Private Property Rights Acts Scoring 
                                                          
 139. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-206(e) (2000). 
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Provision Description Score Justification 
Nonexpansive 
(Assessment) 
This act does not create a 
right of action against 
the government, it 
merely requires the 
government to perform a 
takings assessment prior 
to action. 
10 While an assessment-
only act seems 
innocuous, the fact that 
the act is on the books 
discourages 
environmental regulation, 
earning this provision a 
small penalty. 
Expansive 
(Compensation) 
The act expands the 
private property rights of 
state residents and 
creates a cause of action 
requiring compensation 
for diminution in value. 
30 By expanding private 
property rights of state 
residents, the state makes 
some state regulations 
require compensation 
even though the same 
regulations, were they 
promulgated by the 
federal government, 
would not. 
Affects  
Executive  
Bodies 
The act only applies to 
actions of the executive, 
including state 
administrative agencies 
5 Identity test. Executive 
agencies are the default 
targets of all private 
property rights acts. 
Affects Local 
Governments 
The act also applies to 
the legislative action of 
local governments, 
including cities, counties 
or municipalities 
6 An act that also applies to 
local governments is 
significantly more 
restrictive, because it 
discourages gap-filling at 
a local level, even where 
there is political will and 
money. 
Affects State 
Legislature 
The act is binding on the 
state legislature itself. 
10 In the absence of a 
repeal, the state 
legislature may not even 
pass laws that regulate 
private property without 
scrutiny. This is a potent 
restriction because it 
significantly discourages 
environmental regulation. 
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Applies to  
Exactions 
The act applies to 
exactions, and therefore 
determinations may be 
challenged on an as-
applied basis. 
8 By applying to exactions, 
every aggrieved property 
owner may challenge the 
agency action, resulting 
in considerable expense 
and uneven enforcement. 
Applies to Final 
Rules 
The act allows 
challenges to final 
agency rules, regardless 
of whether they have 
been applied. 
5 By allowing challenges 
to final rules, the agency 
is discouraged from 
promulgating far-
reaching regulations for 
fear that they will be 
struck down before they 
are ever applied. 
Applies to  
Proposed Rules 
The act allows 
challenges to proposed 
agency rules that have 
not yet gone into effect. 
6 This is an even more 
aggressive way of 
discouraging agency 
action, because the 
agency can be challenged 
before their rules are 
finalized, in effect 
creating a threat for even 
considering regulation 
that might affect private 
property. 
Outside Review The review of whether 
an agency action will 
cause a taking is 
performed in whole or in 
part by a reviewer 
outside the promulgating 
agency, usually the 
attorney general. 
7 The use of outside review 
exposes the process to 
politicization, and 
discourages the 
promulgation of far-
reaching regulations. 
No Emergency 
Exceptions 
The act makes no 
provision for emergency 
regulation that may 
interfere with private 
property rights. 
3 A small penalty is given 
for providing no 
emergency exception, 
because it means a 
private landowner could 
potentially block critical 
stop-gap regulation while 
a compensation claim 
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was being assessed. 
Fee-Shifting Successful challenges to 
the act require that the 
promulgating body pay 
the attorneys’ fees of the 
challenger. 
12 Fee-shifting provisions 
create incentives for 
aggrieved parties to 
challenge a regulation, 
because their attorneys’ 
fees may be paid by the 
government if the 
challenge is successful. 
Likewise, they encourage 
challenges of small 
claims that might 
otherwise be too small 
for an attorney to take. 
Paid Repeals The act requires the 
promulgating agency to 
pay the costs of a 
challenge even where it 
repeals the act prior to a 
final takings 
determination. 
8 This is another 
aggressive means of 
encouraging challenges 
to regulation, because the 
promulgating agency 
cannot escape paying 
compensation for the 
temporary imposition 
even by repealing the act. 
Limited  
Applicability 
The act applies only to 
select types of private 
property regulation. 
x0.1 This category, in effect, 
dramatically lowers the 
stringency of acts that 
require review of only 
select regulations. If the 
statute only applies in 
limited circumstances, 
the entire score is 
multiplied by 1/10. 
Minimum Score = 0 (least discouraging) 
Maximum Score = 100 (most discouraging) 
C. Categorization by State 
The same state-by-state categorization process was repeated with the 
PPRAs. All twenty statutes were analyzed according to whether the 
features described above were present or absent in the statute. For the most 
part, this process was much more straightforward for the PPRAs than it was 
for the NMSRs. The PPRAs tend to be more explicit in their intentions, and 
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the categories used in this paper are more closely tied to language in the 
statutes. Once again, though, where a PPRA was not clear one way or the 
other, the PPRA was not included in a category. Thus, the categorizations 
err on the side of under-inclusion, and therefore may underestimate actual 
stringency. As before, where a decent argument could be made for listing, 
the state was included in a category. 
Again, to minimize the inevitable influence from interpretive bias, a 
simple sensitivity analysis was used to test the scoring in an iterative 
process to ensure that the rankings of the states did not change significantly 
depending on a few stringency points allocated between one feature or 
another. 
Table 4 shows the breakdown by state of the features identified, along 
with each state’s final stringency score. All scores have been rounded to the 
nearest integer. 
Based on the PPRA stringency scores, Map 2 shows a map of the 
United States shaded by stringency. The scores are grouped in bins of ten 
points. 
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Table 4 
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Category Pts      
Nonexpansive 
(Assessment) 10 • •  • • 
Expansive 
(Compensation) 30   •   
       
Affects  
Executive  
Bodies 
5 • • • • • 
Affects Local 
Governments 6 •  • •  
Affects State 
Legislature 10      
       
Applies to  
Exactions 8 •  •   
Applies to Final 
Rules 5  • •  • 
Applies to  
Proposed Rules 6 •   •  
       
Outside Review 7 • • •   
No Emergency 
Exceptions 3 • • • • • 
Fee-Shifting 12 •  •   
Paid Repeals 8      
       
Limited  
Applicability x0.1      
STRINGENCY  57 30 76 30 23 
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Category Pts      
Nonexpansive 
(Assessment) 10 •  • •  
Expansive 
(Compensation) 30  •   • 
       
Affects  
Executive  
Bodies 
5 • • • • • 
Affects Local 
Governments 6  •   • 
Affects State 
Legislature 10     • 
       
Applies to  
Exactions 8  •  • • 
Applies to Final 
Rules 5  • • • • 
Applies to  
Proposed Rules 6 •   •  
       
Outside Review 7   •   
No Emergency 
Exceptions 3   •   
Fee-Shifting 12     • 
Paid Repeals 8     • 
       
Limited  
Applicability x0.1  •   • 
STRINGENCY  21 5 30 34 8 
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Category Pts      
Nonexpansive 
(Assessment) 10 • •  •  
Expansive 
(Compensation) 30   •  • 
       
Affects  
Executive  
Bodies 
5 • • • • • 
Affects Local 
Governments 6     • 
Affects State 
Legislature 10      
       
Applies to  
Exactions 8  •  • • 
Applies to Final 
Rules 5   •  • 
Applies to  
Proposed Rules 6 • •  •  
       
Outside Review 7    •  
No Emergency 
Exceptions 3  • •   
Fee-Shifting 12     • 
Paid Repeals 8      
       
Limited  
Applicability x0.1   •   
STRINGENCY  21 32 4 36 66 
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Category Pts      
Nonexpansive 
(Assessment) 10 • • • • • 
Expansive 
(Compensation) 30      
       
Affects  
Executive  
Bodies 
5 • • • • • 
Affects Local 
Governments 6 •  •   
Affects State 
Legislature 10      
       
Applies to  
Exactions 8 •    • 
Applies to Final 
Rules 5 •   •  
Applies to  
Proposed Rules 6 • • •  • 
       
Outside Review 7  •    
No Emergency 
Exceptions 3 •  • •  
Fee-Shifting 12    •  
Paid Repeals 8      
       
Limited  
Applicability x0.1      
STRINGENCY  43 28 30 35 29 
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V.  CASE STUDY: DEVOLUTION OF WETLANDS PROTECTION 
RESPONSIBILITY 
The purpose of this brief case study is to gain insight into the impact 
that devolution will have in the wetlands context. Although the potential 
devolution of Clean Water Act authority following SWANCC would impact 
much more than wetlands,140 wetlands do make for a compelling study for 
the following reasons: (1) only sixteen states141 have existing wetlands 
protections, meaning that many states would have to adopt new rules in the 
event of a federal rollback; and (2) wetlands continue to be major targets 
for development.142 
Results are reported both with and without Alaska’s wetlands included 
in the national total. With more wetlands in Alaska than the rest of the 
                                                          
 140. The Supreme Court limited the scope of the term granting jurisdiction to, “waters of the 
United States,” which is used in parts of the Clean Water Act other than just § 404. See N. Cook 
County. v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 163-164 (2001). 
 141. Sixteen states have independent (nonfederal) wetlands protections: Connecticut, Florida, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin. The other two-thirds of states 
depend on the Federal wetlands programs. And just because there are existing state protections does not 
mean those protections necessarily cover all wetlands. Ass’n of State Wetlands Mgrs., State Wetland 
Programs, available at http://www.aswm.org/swp/states.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004). 
 142. As of 2000, the Corps averaged around 80,000 nationwide and general permits each year, and 
5,000 individual permits. See http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/cepa/releases/nationwidepermits.htm (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2004). 
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states combined, the results are excessively skewed, and may create a 
misleading statistical picture. 
As a second preliminary matter, there is no distinction made here 
between the quality or type of wetlands. While this is certainly a useful 
avenue for future analysis, only total acreages are examined here.143 Thus, 
the question of whether wetlands are “isolated” or not, and the corollary 
question of what “isolated” means, are totally avoided. This analysis is 
simply to gain an understanding of how legal limitations to state 
rulemaking are related to actual wetland endowments. 
The first question is how many acres of wetlands are in states that are 
subject to either NMSRs or PPRAs.144 The number of acres in states 
subject to any kind of NMSR is approximately 220 million acres. These 
represent 77% of the wetlands in the United States (42% excluding 
Alaska). The number of acres subject to generally applicable NMSRs is 
approximately 35 million acres. These represent approximately 12% of 
wetlands in the United States (30% excluding Alaska). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 143. The acreage estimates are drawn from U.S. Geological Survey, National Water Summary on 
Wetland Resources (1999), available at http://water.usgs.gov/nwsum/WSP2425/ (last visited Nov. 27, 
2004). In some cases, wetland acreages were reported as a percentage of total state acreage. In these 
cases, wetland acreages were estimated by multiplying the percentage by the total acreage. All 
estimates are rough approximations. 
 144. For purposes of the NMSR analysis here in the wetlands context, Wisconsin (which does have 
a NMSR) is being excluded because of its preemptive gap-filling measure. See supra note 29 and 
accompanying text. An analysis focusing on a water quality issue other than wetlands should not 
necessarily exclude Wisconsin’s NMSR. 
Figure 1: Cumulative Percentages of Total U.S. 
Wetland Acres in States with No More Stringent 
Rules, by Stringency
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Figure 2: Cumulative Percentages of Total U.S. 
Wetland Acres in States with Private Property Rights 
Acts, by Stringency
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Figure 1 shows the cumulative percentages of wetland acres in each 
stringency class. Because of the strong influence of Alaska and its limited 
applicability rule, most of the total wetland acres in the United States are in 
fact subject to some kind of NMSR. Nonetheless, even when Alaska is 
excluded, the cumulative percentage does not drop below 25% until the 
stringency class of 30-40. 
The number of wetland acres in states subject to any kind of PPRA is 
approximately 60 million acres. These represent 21% of the total wetland 
acres in the United States (52% excluding Alaska). The number of acres 
subject to generally applicable PPRAs is approximately 40 million acres. 
These represent approximately 14% of wetlands in the United States (34% 
excluding Alaska). 
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Figure 2 shows the cumulative percentages of wetland acres in each 
stringency class. Because Alaska does not have a PPRA, the results are 
skewed to the low end while the state is included. But when Alaska is 
removed, one can see that more than half of the wetland acres in the 
remainder of the United States are subject to some kind of PPRA. 
Furthermore, the cumulative percentage does not fall below 25% until the 
40-50 class, and the highest stringency class still holds about 10% of the 
wetlands in the United States. 
If we consider the combined effects: The number of acres subject to 
either a NMSR, PPRA, or both, is approximately 251 million acres. These 
represent around 88% of the wetlands in the United States (70% excluding 
Alaska). If only generally applicable NMSRs and PPRAs are included, the 
total acreage is approximately 55 million acres. These represent 19% of the 
country’s wetlands; 48% if Alaska is excluded. Thus, about half of the 
wetlands in the contiguous United States are subject to at least one of the 
generally applicable legal limitations to state rulemaking.  
From this brief analysis, one can conclude that well more than half of 
the country’s wetlands are in states that may experience difficulty filling in 
the gap in the event of a federal rollback. Of course, it is unlikely at this 
time that all wetlands will lose federal protections. But if one assumes that 
there is some correlation between the number of “isolated” wetlands and 
the number of total wetlands in any given state, then this analysis can be 
used as a starting point for predicting the actual number of wetlands that 
may lose protection. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Before federal policymakers choose to devolve their responsibility for 
environmental protection to the states, they should consider the potential 
for limitations that states impose on themselves to interfere with the 
assumption of such responsibility. In terms of the original question, 
whether states could indeed maintain existing levels of environmental 
protection in the absence of current federal programs, this paper suggests 
that the gap-filling process, on a national scale, would be made more 
difficult because of “no more stringent” rules and private property rights 
acts. “No more stringent” rules represent outright obstacles to rulemaking; 
Private property rights acts serve as deterrents. In both cases, they inhibit 
states from protecting environmental resources to the same extent as the 
federal government. 
Thirty-five states have at least one—if not both—of these legal 
limitations to gap-filling. In the wetlands context alone, these states contain 
approximately 88% of the nation’s wetlands. In the event of a federal 
rollback, these wetlands, as well as other natural resources, could 
consequently receive lowered levels of environmental protection. 
Of course, neither NMSRs nor PPRAs have undergone meaningful 
legal challenges to date. It is entirely possible that courts will limit the 
applicability of these limitations if they are triggered by state rules filling in 
for a federal rollback. If a court were to determine, for example, that a 
particular NMSR does not apply to jurisdictional boundaries, that NMSR 
would present little obstacle to gap-filling in the SWANCC context. 
But this uncertainty over interpretation is no reason for devolution to 
proceed without considering the potential environmental consequences. If 
maintaining current levels of protection is indeed a goal, these self-imposed 
legal limitations must not be ignored. 
 
